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By all accounts, poverty in Chile has declined dramatically over the last 20 years, with the national 
headcount ratio declining from nearly 40% in 1987 to below 14% in 2006.  Due to data limitations, most 
research on poverty in Chile has focused on national and regional estimates, yet recent improvements in 
poverty mapping methodologies now enable the analysis of poverty at the sub-regional level.  In this 
paper, we employ these methodologies to assess the impact of cash transfers on poverty rates at the 
county level.  We find that transfers significantly reduce the incidence of poverty and that estimated 
headcount ratios fall by between 5% and 68%.  To better understand variation in the effectiveness of 
transfers in reducing poverty at the local level, we also explore the interplay between transfers and 
geography.  We find that the greatest reductions in poverty at the county level occur in rural households 
and  that  topography  influences  the  effectiveness  of  transfers  in  some  areas.    Taken  together,  these 
findings suggest that targeting at low levels of aggregation can help to deliver further reductions in 
poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
  Chile’s  dramatic  increase  in  income  over  the  last  20  years  has  been  matched  by  an 
equally dramatic reduction in poverty: while GDP per capita increased from US$ 1,679 in 1987 
to US$ 7,214 in 2006,
1 the proportion of Chileans living below official poverty lines fell from 
39.4% to 13.7% (Figure 1).  Although economy-wide growth explains much of the reduction in 
poverty  rates  in  the  past  (Larrañaga,  1994;  Contreras,  2003),  a  series  of  cash  and  in-kind 
transfers from the government to poor households also proved to be fundamental to poverty 
alleviation (Beyer, 1997; Valdés, 1999).
2   
  Current estimates of poverty (as measured by the headcount ratio) range from 11.2% in 
copper-rich  Region  II  to  29.7%  in  largely-agricultural  Region  IX.
3   However,  these  simple 
statistics obscure the profound economic diversity found within each of Chile’s 13 regions.  For 
example, mining accounts for between 57 and 65% of the Region II’s total economic activity 
(and 95% of its exports), but copper and other economically important minerals are concentrated 
in Calama,  Ollague, and other counties in the  region’s  mountainous northeast.  By  contrast, 
Mejillones, Tocopilla, and other coastal counties have felt the economic impact of declines in the 
Chilean fish flake and saltpeter industries since the early part of this decade (Government of 
Antofagasta 2007).  In Region IX, growth in tourism and cellulose production in recent decades 
has  primarily  benefited  resort  communities  in  the  Andes  and  lumber-producing  areas  in  the 
coastal  mountains,  respectively,  while  the  Central  Valley  has  seen  limited  investment  and  a 
                                                   
1 In purchasing Power Parity terms, GDP per capita rose from $3,608 in 1987 to $12,737 by 2006. 
2 Cowen and De Gregorio (1996) argue that even though a one percentage point increase in growth rates was 
associated with a 0.4 percentage point reduction in poverty between 1990 and 1994, it is difficult to separate the 
pure effect of growth from the impact of government transfers because social policy affects economic growth. 
3 Chile  is  comprised  of  13  administrative  regions.    Each  has  a  formal name  and  a Roman  numeral, the latter 
generally used.  The numbers are assigned sequentially from north to south, with the exception of Region XIII (the 
Santiago Metropolitan Region), which is located between Regions V and VI.  Each region consists of multiple 
provinces, which are further divided into 342 communes, i.e., counties.  Each county has its own government except 
Antártica, which is governed by Cabo de Hornos County.  In this paper, we focus on the remaining 341 independent 
counties.   3 
decline in the sugar beet industry (Government of Araucanía, 2007).  Such variation in economic 
and geographic conditions implies that there exists a wide distribution of poverty within regions, 
and uncovering this distribution may have important consequences for the design of social policy.   
  Unfortunately,  the  Chilean  census  does  not  include  income  data,  and  no  survey  with 
detailed income data is representative below the regional level in Chile.  Thus, Contreras (1996, 
2001), Contreras and Ruiz-Tagle (1997), Feres (2000), Pizzolito (2005a, 2005b), and others who 
have  studied  poverty  and  income  distribution  in  Chile  have  restricted  their  analyses  to  the 
national  and  regional  levels,  where  estimates  of  income  are  statistically  reliable.    However, 
recent developments in methodologies for combining survey and census data now enable the 
estimation of statistically-reliable measures of poverty at the sub-regional level.
4    
  In this paper, we employ the poverty-mapping methodologies formalized by Elbers, et al. 
(2003)  to  assess  the  impact  of  cash  transfers  on  poverty  rates  at  the  county  level,  two 
administrative units below the regional level.  We find that cash transfers result in economically- 
and statistically-significant reductions in county-level poverty rates across Chile.  However, the 
estimated  reductions in  headcount  ratios  range  from  5.1% to  67.8%, indicating  that there  is 
considerable variation in the effectiveness of cash transfers in bringing people out of poverty.  To 
better understand this variation, we also explore the interplay between transfers and geography.  
We find that the greatest reductions in poverty occur in rural areas, although urban concentration 
and topography both appear to influence the effectiveness of cash transfers on poverty within 
regions,  suggesting  that  geographic  considerations  may  be  useful  for  improving  targeting 
performance.  This evidence is consistent with the theoretical predictions described by Besley 
                                                   
4 Hentschel, et al. (1999) estimate geographically-disaggregated poverty rates in Ecuador by imputing income from 
survey data for every individual in the census.  Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2003) improve upon these poverty-
mapping methods by incorporating errors from the first stage to obtain more precise estimates of income.  These 
methods  have  been  applied  to  South  Africa  (Demombynes  and  Özler  2006)  and  Cambodia,  Ecuador,  and 
Madagascar (Elbers, et al. 2007), and elsewhere.    4 
and  Kanbur  (1990)  and  with  empirical  evidence  from  Cambodia,  Ecuador,  and  Madagascar 
reported by Elbers, et al. (2007). 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview 
of  the  poverty  mapping  methodology  proposed  by  Elbers,  et  al.  (2003)  and  discusses  its 
implementation in the Chilean context; section 3 describes government programs for poverty 
reduction  in  Chile,  including  the  various  subsidies  available  to  poor  households;  section  4 




  The methodology proposed by Hentschel, et al. (2000) and developed by Elbers, et al. 
(2003) takes advantage of the detailed data in household surveys and the universal coverage of 
censuses. The intuition is conceptually straightforward: household income is estimated using 
survey data, restricting the explanatory variables to those available in both the survey and a 
census from a similar point in time. These parameters are then used to estimate income for the 
entire  population  based  on  the  census  data.  Finally,  poverty  indicators  are  estimated  for 
geographic areas for which the census is representative but for which the survey is not.  
The  execution  of  the  method  is  somewhat  more  complicated.  We  provide  a  brief 
overview  here  and  a  detailed  accounting  in  Appendix  1;  readers  who  are  interested  in  the 
complete  statistical  properties  of  the  estimators  are referred  to  Elbers,  et  al.  (2003).  First,  a 
detailed household survey is used to estimate the joint distribution of household income and a 
vector of explanatory variables. Restricting the set of explanatory variables to those available in 
the census, these “first stage” estimates are then used to generate the distribution of income for   5 
any subgroup of the population, conditioning on the observed characteristics of that subgroup. 
The simplest means of estimating the model is via a linear approximation of the conditional 
expectation, allowing geographic effects and heteroskedasticity in the distribution of the error 
term. It is important to note that the cluster component of the residual can significantly reduce 
the power of the estimates in the second stage, so it is important to explain the variation in 
income  due  to  location  via  observable  variables  to  the  greatest  extent  possible;  stepwise 
regression is therefore used to derive the best-fitting specification for each of Chile’s 13 regions 
independently.  
The result of this first-stage estimation is a vector of coefficients, a variance-covariance 
matrix associated with this vector, and a set of parameters that describe the distribution of the 
errors.  The  second  stage  utilizes  this  set  of  parameters  along  with  the  characteristics  of  the 
individuals or households in the census in order to generate predicted values of income and the 
relevant errors. For these effects, bootstrapping is used to simulate values of household income. 
The complete set of simulated values is then used to calculate the expected value of poverty for 
each subgroup. This procedure is repeated 250 times, taking a new set of coefficients and errors 
for each simulation.   The mean and standard deviations of these coefficients constitute the point 
estimates and standard deviations for the poverty indicator, respectively. 
Finally, the standard error of the poverty indicator must be estimated as accurately as 
possible in order to infer precise conclusions from the estimates. As shown in Appendix 1, the 
prediction error has three components: the first is given by the presence of a stochastic error in 
the first stage model, which implies that the actual income of the household deviates from its 
expected value (idiosyncratic error); the second is determined by the variance of the first stage 
parameter estimators (model error); and the third is given by the use of an inaccurate method to   6 
calculate the estimator of the poverty indicator (computation error). The idiosyncratic error falls 
proportionately with the size of the population in each area. This component of the error rises 
with lower levels of geographic disaggregation, limiting the extent of disaggregation possible. 
The model error is determined by the properties of the first stage estimators; its magnitude thus 
depends only on the precision of the first stage parameter estimates. For this reason, we made 
every effort to obtain the best fit in the first-stage regression. The computation error falls by 
increasing the number of simulations. We specify 250 simulations to reduce this component of 
the error as much as possible.
5 
 
3. Public Policy for Poverty Reduction in Chile 
  Beginning in the early 1980s, the government adopted a wide-ranging set of policies to 
reduce  poverty.    Central  to  the  government’s  anti-poverty  policy  was  the  development  of  a 
standardized metric to identify poor households.  The “CAS Card” (revised and renamed the 
“CAS-2 Card” in 1987) is administered by the county at the household’s request; it evaluates 
poverty  on  the  basis  of  self-reported  income  and  housing  criteria,  particularly  construction 
materials, density, and access to potable water.  A score is assigned to the household and remains 
valid for three years, at which point a re-evaluation may be requested.
6  
  The CAS Card became the primary data point for setting government priorities in the 
provision of public housing, with the concentration of poor households in any given region in 
1982  and  1992  directly  influencing  the  allocation  of  housing  subsidies  over  the  subsequent 
decade (Soto and Torche 2004).  Between 1990 and 2000, housing subsidies increased at an 
average rate of 10% per year in real terms, and poor neighborhoods received additional subsidies 
                                                   
5 There are no significant gains in efficiency by further increasing the number of repetitions. 
6 Soto and Torche (2004) provide additional details on the CAS form and the classification of poor households.   7 
to develop public sewerage and electric systems on the basis of these criteria.  These criteria 
were also used to identify indigent households eligible for receiving direct cash transfers.  
  Government subsidies to poor households fall into five main programs: 
 
1.  Family Subsidy (SUF): A subsidy provided to pregnant women, parents with children not 
covered by social security, and parents or guardians of persons with physical disabilities.  
Eligibility is determined by the CAS-2 Card.  This program is administered by individual 
counties,  but  the  budget  is  assigned  by  the  regional  governments  according  to  the 
distribution  of  CAS-2  Card  scores  in  each  county.    The  benefit  was  CH$  4,126  per 
month
7 per recipient in 2003, and it is indexed to inflation.  
  
2.  Assistance Pensions (PASIS): Pensions provided for adults aged 65 and over, physically-
disabled adults, and  mentally-disabled individuals regardless of  age  who have  a total 
income  below  half  of  the  minimum  pension  allowance.
8   These  transfers  are  only 
available to individuals who have at least three continuous years of residency in Chile 
and  who  do  not  receive  any  other  pensions.    The  regional  government  evaluates 
households for eligibility based on the CAS-2 Card score; however, because the number 
of subsidies available to each region is fixed by the Social Security Commission, the cut-
off score varies by region (and, potentially, by county).  In 2003, the benefit totaled CH$ 
45,091 per month for the physically disabled and twice that amount for the mentally 
disabled; it, too, is indexed to inflation.   
 
3.  Chile Solidario: A program that includes both cash and counseling services for indigent 
and high-risk households, particularly those with female heads.  Eligibility is determined 
by  the  CAS-2  Card.    During  the  first  phase  of  the  program,  beneficiaries  receive  a 
monthly payment that decreases from CH$ 10,500 to CH$ 4,126 over 24 months (2003 
rates), conditional on frequent meetings with counselors to learn budgeting, goal-setting, 
and employment skills; counselors also offer guidance on other support programs for 
which  the  household  may  be  eligible.    After  two  years,  beneficiaries  who  have 
successfully completed the counseling program are automatically enrolled in the SUF 
program for up to 36 months. 
 
 
4.  Water and Sewage Subsidy (SAP): A three-year, renewable subsidy to offset the cost of 
water among poor households. Eligibility is determined by the CAS-2 Card.  Although 
the program is administered by the county government, the Ministry of Finance sets the 
budget available to each region and regional governments set the number of subsidies 
available to each county; as such, the cut-off score may vary by county.  This subsidy 
covers between 20% and 85% of the cost of water for up to 15 cubic meters per month; it 
is paid directly to water providers and discounted from the water bills of beneficiaries. 
 
                                                   
7 In 2003, US$ 1 = CH$ 691.4 on average. 
8 The minimum monthly pension allowance was CH$ 8,9715 in 2006.   8 
5.  Unemployment: A decreasing monthly payment for up to 12 months for individuals who 
lost work through no fault of their own.  Eligibility is based on formal employment for at 
least 52 weeks during the previous two years
9 and not having rejected job opportunities 
offered by the National Training and Employment Service or the county government.  
Although  the CAS-2  Card is not  used to assign  this  subsidy,  it  is  designed  with  the 
intention of preventing households from falling into poverty as a result of employment 
shocks.  In 2003, the benefit was CH$ 17,338 the first 3 months, decreasing to CH$ 
11,560 for the next three months and to CH$ 8,669 the last 6 months of eligibility. 
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the number of recipients in each of Chile’s 13 
regions in 2003. Nearly 954,000 individuals (6.3 per cent of the population) receive the Family 
Subsidy each month.  Almost 13% of the people living in Region IX benefit, while fewer than 
2.3%  of  households  in  region  XII  do.    By  contrast,  only  3,682  individuals  received 
Unemployment transfers each month on average, although this is at least partially due to the fact 
that the government replaced the transfer with mandatory unemployment insurance for those 
starting new jobs since 2002; this transfer is therefore no longer a policy tool for addressing 
poverty.  The average monthly value of Unemployment payments is CH$ 11,491.  Assistance 
Pensions dwarf the other subsidies, with an average benefit of CH$ 45,059.  However, only 2.8% 
of Chile’s population receives these transfers.  The distribution of this subsidy is similar to that 
of the Family Subsidy.  
The Solidarity Subsidy and Water and Sewage Subsidy are provided to households rather 
than individuals.  Approximately 1.1% of households receive the former, with the greatest share 
in Regions III and VII.  The average monthly value of the Solidarity Subsidy is CH$ 9,842.  The 
Water and  Sewage  Subsidy  is  allocated  to  almost 16% of  households,  and  it is particularly 
prevalent in the arid north of Chile (Regions I, II, III, and IV) and in Region XI.  Unlike many 
other subsidies, the value of the Water and Sewage Subsidy varies by region, with beneficiaries 
                                                   
9 For self-employed workers, eligibility is based on 12 consecutive months of contributions to social security in the 
previous two years.   9 
in Regions I, II, and XI receiving far greater subsidies than households elsewhere, reflecting the 
cost of purchasing and transporting water in these areas.
10    
  Weighting  household  subsidies  by  the  mean  number  of  household  members  in  each 
region, the total expected monthly value of all subsidies for a representative person ranges from 
CH$  966  in  Region  XIII  to  CH$  3,595  in  Region  XI;  the  national  average  is  CH$  1,708. 
According to Chilean law, taxes cannot be tied to individual expenditures, so there is no specific 
financing for cash transfers to poor households. Therefore, transfers are financed out of total tax 
revenues. In 2003, 51.6% of total tax revenues came from the Value Added Tax, 27.4% from 
income taxes, 12.1% from excise taxes, 4.5% from tariffs, and 4.4% from transaction taxes.  
  Figure 2 shows the distribution of average transfers by type by pre-transfer income decile.  
As the figure suggests, cash transfers have good targeting on average.  Nevertheless, the top half 
of the income distribution receives a significant share of transfers, including transfers for which 




  The  survey  employed  to  impute  income  as  described  above  is  the  November  2003 
Characterizacion Socioeconomica Nacional (CASEN), administered by the University of Chile 
on behalf of the Ministry of Planning.  The survey utilizes multistage random sampling with 
regional stratification and clustering.  In the first stage, the country is divided between rural and 
urban areas for each of the 13 regions, and the primary sampling units are selected according to a 
probability  sample  based  on  the  2002  census.    Within  each  sampling  unit,  households  are 
                                                   
10 For example, the cost of drinking water is up to 66 per cent higher than the national average in Region XI despite 
heavy rainfall in the area.   10 
selected  with  equal  probability.
11   The  final  sample  includes  68,153  households  comprising 
257,077 people. These households represent 315 of the 342 counties in Chile, with as few as 49 
and as many as 315 households surveyed in each county.  The nationally representative survey 
allows for two forms of disaggregation: the survey is representative for all households by region 
and for urban and/or rural households at the national level.  Although the Ministry of Planning 
purports that the CASEN is also representative for 301 self-reporting counties, scholars (e.g., 
Valdés  1999;  Contreras,  et  al.  2001;  Pizzolito  2005b)  widely  agree  that  the  survey  is  not 
representative at the sub-regional level.
12  
  The  CASEN  includes  detailed  income  data for  individuals  and  households,  including 
cash transfers from the government.  The Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) corrects these data for reporting errors and discrepancies as summarized in 
Appendix 2 and detailed in ECLAC, IPEA, and UNDP (2002).  The survey also includes data on 
demographic  characteristics  of  household  members,  living  conditions,  ownership  of  durable 
goods, access to sanitation, and health and education characteristics.  Using the CASEN alone to 
estimate poverty at low levels of aggregation yields weak results that allow for few conclusions 
given the magnitude of the errors.  For example, the estimated headcount ratio among urban 
households in San Nicolás County (which is nominally representative at the county level) in 
Region  VIII  is  48.1%,  but  with  a  standard  error  of  12.6%,  the  95%  confidence  interval  of 
[23.4%,72.8%] is too wide to describe poverty with any precision.  In response to these problems, 
Agostini, Brown, and Góngora (2007) advocate the use of poverty mapping methodologies to 
impute income for everyone in the census using the 2003 CASEN.  For the same county, they 
                                                   
11 Further methodological details are provided by Pizzolito (2005). 
12 Even if the CASEN was representative, the standard errors for poverty estimated at the county level are so large 
that  estimated  changes  in  poverty  are  statistically  insignificant.    Nevertheless,  Santibáñez  (2006)  compares 
headcount ratios at the county level in 2000 and 2003 to conclude that poverty decreased in 184 counties and 
increased in 106 others.  Without considering standard errors, however, such conclusions are statistically unreliable.   11 
estimate  the  urban  headcount  ratio  to  be  48.4%,  with  a  95%  confidence  interval  of 
[40.3%,56.6%].
13     
  The 2002 Chilean census collects data from 4,112,838 households comprising 15,545,921 
individuals.  The  data  include  demographic  characteristics  of  household  members,  living 
conditions,  ownership  of  durable  goods,  access  to  sanitation,  and  health  and  education 
characteristics, but neither income nor consumption.  Following Elbers, et al. (2003), a set of 
variables common to both the CASEN and census is used to impute income. Although some 
explanatory variables are defined identically in both data sets, others were constructed; in such 
cases, the means and variances of the explanatory variables were evaluated to ensure that they 
are  identically  defined.    Using  stepwise  regression  to  detect  the  best  fit  for rural  and  urban 
households  in  each  region separately,  we  determined that  household  demographics  (e.g.,  the 
number of household members; the share of young children in the household), characteristics of 
the household head (e.g., gender; education level; ethnicity), characteristics of the house itself 
(e.g., number of rooms; construction material; type of flooring; water source; sewerage), and 
asset ownership (e.g., washing machine; water heater; fixed telephone; cellular phone; satellite or 
cable  television;  microwave;  computer;  Internet  access)  were  the  strongest  predictors  of 
household  income.  Estimates  also  included  location  dummies  to  capture  latent  cluster-level 
effects.  The  predictive  ability  of  the  model  is  high  for  cross-sectional  data,  with  R
2  values 
ranging between 0.28 and 0.54 (Agostini, et al. 2007). 
 
 
                                                   
13 To cite other examples, the estimated headcount ratio and associated 95% confidence interval using the CASEN 
alone is 23.6% [-3.9%,51.2%] for Yerbas Buenas County and 39.7% [28.6%,50.8%] for Pitrufquén County.  The 
corresponding  figures  from  Agostini,  et  al.  (2007)  are  42.3%  [31.8%,51.7%]  for  Yerbas  Buenas  and    39.7% 
[36.1%,43.2%] for Pitrufquén.   12 
5. Empirical Results 
  Using the coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix estimated as described above, 
we calculate poverty rates in each of Chile’s 342 counties.  Because Chile’s rural and urban 
poverty lines differ, headcount ratios are estimated separately for rural and urban households, 
and  a  weighted  average  of  the  rural  and  urban  poverty  rates  is  reported.    Table  2  provides 
summary statistics of the estimates and Figures 3 through 6 illustrate these estimates graphically.  
In each figure, the left and right panels depict the estimated headcount ratio prior to the receipt of 
cash  transfers  from  the  government  and  after  the  receipt  of  transfers,  respectively.    Darker 
shading indicates higher poverty rates within the county.  Pre-transfer estimates of poverty range 
from 1.6% in the Santiago suburb of Vitacura to 54.3% in Pemuco (Region VIII); post-transfer 
estimates of poverty vary from 1.4% in Vitacura to 48.7% in Los Álamos County (Region VIII). 
  Poverty in Chile displays strong regional patterns.  For example, poverty rates before the 
receipt of cash transfers are generally lowest in counties in Regions II and XII, both of which are 
rich in natural resources.  By contrast, the median pre-transfer poverty rate is highest for Regions 
IV, VIII, and IX, which are largely dependent on agriculture for income.  Just over 25% of the 
people in the largely urban counties of Regions V and XIII live below the poverty line.  County-
level variation in poverty rates is greatest in Regions XII and XIII and lowest in Region VI. 
  The Chilean Constitution stipulates that taxes cannot be directly tied to expenditures, so 
cash transfers for poverty reduction are financed out of total tax revenues.  Because Chile’s value 
added tax contributes over half of the country’s tax revenue and because income tax data are not 
made available by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service, it is difficult to assess the tax burden of 
individual households, and thus the impact of taxes on poverty.  It may therefore be the case that 
taxes exacerbate poverty.  Indeed, inasmuch as consumption taxes are regressive, our estimates   13 
of  the  impact  of  cash  transfers  may  be  biased  upward  given  the  lack  of  information  about 
financing.
14  Nevertheless, there exists tremendous heterogeneity in poverty within regions, even 
if headcount ratios in poor areas are overstated. 
  Cash transfers to poor households have a profound impact on poverty rates in Regions I, 
IV, VII, VIII, and IX, where transfers induce a 17.3% reduction in the share of the population 
living in poverty in the median county.  These effects are greater still in Regions X, XI, and XII, 
where the median county sees a 23.0% reduction in poverty from transfers.  By contrast, cash 
transfers have a modest impact on the median headcount ratio in Regions II, V, and XIII.  Still, 
the  variance  of  the  distribution  of  the  estimated  impact  is  high  in  Regions  II,  XI,  and  XII, 
suggesting that the effect of cash transfers varies widely even in regions where the median effect 
is comparatively high or comparatively low. 
  To  examine  the  overall  impact  of  cash  transfers  on  poverty  more  formally,  we  also 
estimate the non-parametric density of the county-level headcount ratios before and after cash 
transfers using the Epanechnikov Kernel estimator.  As Figure 7 shows, cash transfers shift the 
distribution of headcount ratios to the left, implying that cash transfers are effective in reducing 
poverty.  Moreover, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions formally 
rejects the hypothesis that the two distributions come from the same data-generating process at 
the 99% confidence level.
15 
  We repeat the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of pre-transfer and post-transfer 
headcount  ratios  separately  for  rural  and  urban  poverty.    Distributions  based  on  the 
                                                   
14 For this reason, our estimates must be considered as measuring the impact of cash transfers on after- tax income 
and not as the net impact of cash transfers on poverty. 
15 The first step of the test does not reject the hypothesis that the distribution of headcount ratios associated with pre-
transfer  incomes  contains  smaller  values  than  the  distribution  of  headcount  ratios  associated  with  pre-transfer 
incomes.  The second step of the test rejects the hypothesis that the distribution of headcount ratios for total income 
contains larger values than the distribution of headcount ratios for autonomous income.  As a result, the joint test 
rejects the hypothesis that the two distributions are equal.   14 
Epanechnikov Kernel estimator are shown in Figures 8 and 9.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
rejects the equality of distributions at the 99% confidence level in both cases, confirming that 
cash  transfers  have  reduced  poverty  in  both  rural  and  urban  areas.    As  the  nonparemetric 
estimates show, the pre-transfer and post-transfer distributions of poverty in rural areas are quite 
different from those in urban areas,
16 suggesting that urban concentration also influences the 
effectiveness of transfers within regions.   
  Given the variation in the effectiveness of transfers in reducing poverty within regions 
and between rural and urban areas, we also investigate the role of geography in poverty reduction 
using regression analysis.  Specifically, we estimate:  
e b b
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where  HCR D % is the percentage change in the headcount ratio based on the weighted estimates 
of poverty for rural and urban households in each county
17 and URBSH is the percentage of 
households  in  the  county  classified  as  being  urban.    POP  is  the  log  of  county  population.  
MOUNTAIN and VALLEY are dummy variables for whether the county lies above 1500 meters in 
elevation and whether the county is principally located in Chile’s Central Valley, respectively, 
and RAIN is a dummy indicating that the county experiences extreme rainfall (i.e., locales that 
receive less than 200 mm of rain per year and those that receive less than more than 1,750 mm of 
rain per year).  These controls are important because the housing criteria included in the CAS-2 
Card assessment of poverty differ across climactic zones.  REGION is a vector of dummies that 
account for variation in the budgets received from the central government, for the ability of 
regional governments to efficiently allocate funding for poverty relief to counties, and for other 
                                                   
16 Indeed,  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  also  rejects  the  hypothesis  that  the  distribution  of  the  reduction  in 
headcount ratios is the same for rural and urban areas. 
17 For robustness, we also estimate this equation using the absolute change in headcount ratios at the dependent 
variable, controlling for pre-transfer headcount ratios.  These estimates are similar to those reported below.   15 
forms of unobserved heterogeneity that is common to all counties within the region.  We further 
interact the region dummies with the urban share variable to estimate the impact of heterogeneity 
in urban concentration within regions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are bootstrapped 
1,000 times to account for the fact that the dependent variable is estimated. 
  Because we cannot estimate a structural model that simultaneously determines poverty, 
transfers, and targeting, regression results should be interpreted as conditional correlations rather 
than causal determinants of the impact of cash transfers on poverty.  In particular, we do not 
have  data  that  allow  us  to  explicitly  evaluate  local  institutions  (e.g.,  the  ability  of  county 
governments to identify poor households) that may influence poverty rates.  Nevertheless, the 
regressors explain a large fraction of the variance in the county data, with an R
2 of 0.96.   
  A higher share in the urban population is associated with lower reductions in poverty in 
all 13 regions of Chile (Figure 3, Column 1).  However, this effect varies widely by region: a one 
percentage  point  increase  in  the  share  of  the  urban  population  is  associated  with  a  0.06% 
reduction  in  the  change  in  headcount  ratio  derived  from  cash  transfers  in  Region  XIII  (the 
omitted category) and a 0.27% reduction in Region XI.  The effectiveness of cash transfers in 
reducing urban poverty especially lags behind that of rural poverty in counties in Regions II, III, 
X,  XI,  and  XII.    This  result  presents  a more  nuanced  picture  of  poverty  reduction  than  the 
regional estimates presented in Table 2, and suggests that it is insufficient to merely target rural 
poverty, urban poverty, or regional poverty, and that it is instead preferable to target rural or 
urban poverty within regions.  
  Conditioning on urban concentration, the results further show that transfers are correlated 
with a greater impact on poverty in more populous areas and in mountainous areas.  By contrast, 
the effect of transfers on poverty is lower in Chile’s Central Valley and in areas with extreme   16 
rainfall.  As with the share of the population living in urban areas, the influences of topography, 
population density, and weather may differ by region.  To begin to account for this possibility, 
we also interact region dummies with dummies for living in mountainous communities (Column 
2).
18  Indeed, we find that cash transfers are correlated with reduced poverty in mountainous 
areas in Regions  I, II,  III, VIII, XI, and  XIII,  but that mountainous areas appear to impede 
poverty reduction appears in Region VII.  These results again suggest that efficiency gains in 
targeting  poverty  may  be  made  from  accounting  for  variation  within  regions. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Since the early 1980s, the Chilean government has made poverty reduction an important 
policy objective.  By the early  part of this decade, Chile’s antipoverty strategy had become 
exemplified by a series of transfers provided to pregnant women, poor parents, female heads of 
household,  the  elderly,  the  handicapped,  the  unemployed,  the  indigent,  and  those  unable  to 
purchase sufficient drinking water.  Such transfers made a significant contribution to the 65% 
decline in poverty rates over the last 20 years. 
While the national poverty rate was estimated to be 18.7% in 2003, the CASEN survey 
demonstrated considerable heterogeneneity in poverty rates across regions.  These disparities 
have  influenced  public  policy,  including  the  allocation  of  budgets  for  antipoverty  programs.  
However, estimates of poverty at the regional level obscure the enormous variation in poverty 
rates within regions.  Yet because the CASEN is not representative at the sub-regional level, 
scholars have not been able to accurately analyze poverty at the sub-regional level. 
                                                   
18 Including  interactions  for  region  dummies  and  population,  the  dummy  for  Central  Valley  communities,  and 
extreme rainfall produces similar results. However, the reduction in degrees of freedom caused by each additional 
set of interactions reduces the ability to identify separate geographic effects within regions.     17 
  To better understand inter-regional differences in the effectiveness of transfers in poverty 
reduction, we employ poverty-mapping methodologies to assess the impact of cash transfers at 
the county level.  Using nonparametric analysis and kernel estimation, we find a high level of 
heterogeneity in the extent to which transfers reduce poverty within each region.  We also find 
sizable differences in poverty reduction between rural and urban areas.  To further explore the 
interplay between transfers, poverty, and geography, we use regression analysis to show that the 
conditional  impact of  urban  concentration  on  poverty  reduction  varies  by  as  much  as  350% 
between  regions.    The  effect  of  topography  also  varies  tremendously  by  region. 
  For  policymakers  and  scholars  alike,  it  would  be  interesting  to  know  the  reasons 
underlying  the  wide  disparities  in  the  extent  to  which  cash  transfers  reduce  poverty  within 
regions.    One  possibility  is  that  the  depth  of  poverty  differs  across  communities  and  that 
relatively uniform transfers fail to reduce headcount ratios in some areas.  Alternatively, it may 
be  that  the  CAS-2  Card  fails  to  identify  some  poor  households.
19   Third,  the  geographic 
distribution of the poor within communities may make targeting more or less difficult.  Finally, it 
may be that institutional failures and/or elite capture of resources prevent transfers from reaching 
poor households even when they are correctly identified.  Each of these possibilities remains an 
important topic of further research.   
  Even if the reasons underlying differences in the effectiveness of cash transfer are not 
well understood, however, it would be possible to evaluate the efficiency of targeting at the 
county level as opposed to the regional level.  Such analyses would be timely because Chile 
realized a budget surplus totaling 7.9% of GDP in 2006 and 5.3% of GDP in the first half of 
                                                   
19 Indeed, the government has already taken important steps to better target the poor by replacing the CAS-2 card 
with the “Social Protection Card” (SPC) in April 2007.  The SPC uses income stability, educational level, labor 
experience, age structure, disabilities, health status, housing ownership, crowding, urban/rural location, and regional 
unemployment levels to identify poor households.   18 
2007, and the government has proposed allocating part of the surplus for additional poverty relief.  
As  we  have  shown  in  this  paper,  including  urban  concentration,  topography,  and  other 
geographic considerations within regions is likely to facilitate greater poverty reductions than 
targeting by region alone.   19 
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Appendix 1 
  This Appendix provides a brief overview of the methodology proposed by Hentschel, et 
al. (2000) and developed by Elbers, et al. (2003).  In the first stage, a model is created that relates 
the income per capita of household h (Yh) in cluster c with a group of observable characteristics 
(Xh):  
hc hc hc hc hc hc u X u X Y E Y + = + = b ] | [ln ln  
where the error vector u is distributed F(0,￿).  To allow correlation within each cluster, the error 
term is further assumed to consist of a cluster component (￿) and an idiosyncratic error (￿): 
hc c hc u e h + =  
The two components are assumed to be independent of each other and uncorrelated with the 
observable variables Xhc.  
  It is not necessary to specify a restrictive functional form for the idiosyncratic component 
of the error, 
2
e s .  Indeed, with consistent estimators of ￿, the residuals of the decomposition of 
the estimated error, 
hc c c hc c hc u u u u e h ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ . . + = - + =  
can be used to estimate the variance of ￿.
20  The functional form commonly used for estimating 
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The upper and lower limits, A and B, can be estimated together with the parameter ￿ using the 
standard  pseudo-maximum  likelihood;  the  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  it  eliminates 
impossible values for the predicted variances. 
                                                   
20 The subindex “.” in the equation represents the average over the index.   22 
  The  simplest  means  of  estimating  the  model  is  to  use  a  linear  approximation  of  the 
conditional expectation, allowing geographic effects and heteroskedasticity into the distribution 
of  the  error  term.    It  is  important  to  note  that  the  cluster  component  of  the  residual  can 
significantly reduce the power of the estimates in the second stage, and that it is thus important to 
explain the variation in income or consumption due to location via observable variables to the 
greatest extent possible.  
  The  result  of  this  first-stage  estimation  is  a  vector  of  coefficients,  ￿,  a  variance-
covariance  matrix  associated  with  this  vector,  and  a  set  of  parameters  that  describe  the 
distribution  of  the  errors.    The  second  stage  utilizes  this  set  of  parameters  along  with  the 
characteristics  of  the  individuals  or  households  in  the  census  in  order  to  generate  predicted 
values of the log of income and the relevant errors.  For these effects, bootstrapping is used to 
simulate values of income of each household or each individual.  These simulated values are 
based on the prediction of the income and the error terms, ￿ and ￿: 
) ˆ ˆ ˆ exp( ˆ
hc c hc hc X Y e h b + + =  
  For each household, the two components of the error term are taken from the empirical 
distribution described by the parameters estimated in the first stage.  The coefficientsb ˆ  are taken 
from a normal multivariate distribution described by the estimators of ￿ in the first stage and the 
associated variance-covariance matrix.  The complete set of simulated values of  hc Y ˆ  is then used 
to calculate the expected value of poverty or inequality measures by area.  This procedure is 
repeated n times, taking a new set of coefficients ￿ and errors for each simulation; for each 
geographic area, the mean and the standard deviation of the poverty indicator are calculated over 
the  whole  set  of  simulations,  which  constitute  its  point  estimate  and  its  standard  deviation, 
respectively.   23 
  We will call the poverty indicator G(nc, Xc, ￿, uc), where nc is a Nc vector of the number 
of household members in county c, Xc is a Ncxk vector of their observable characteristics, and uc 
is a Nc error vector.  Thus, the expected value of the poverty indicator is estimated given the 
characteristics of the individuals and the households and the model estimated in the first stage, 
i.e.: 
[ ] x ; , | X n G E G
E
c =  
where x  is the vector of parameters of the model, including the parameters that describe the 
distribution of the error term.  Replacing the unknown vectorx , with a consistent estimatorx ˆ, we 
get: 
[ ] x ˆ , , | X n G E G
E
c =  
This  conditional  expected  value  is  generally  impossible  to  resolve  analytically,  making  it 





One complication associated with this methodology is calculating the correct standard 
errors,  which  is  not  trivial.    Because  it  is  not  possible  to  calculate  them  analytically,  the 
methodology  again  resorts  to  bootstrapping  techniques  and  Monte  Carlo  simulations.  





and the actual level of the poverty indicator for the geographic area can be decomposed into: 
)
~ ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) (
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The prediction error thus has three components: the first is due to the presence of a stochastic 
error in the first stage model, implying that the actual household incomes deviate from their 
expected values (idiosyncratic error); the second is due to the variance in the estimators of the   24 
parameters of the model from the first stage (model error); and the third is due to the use of an 
inexact method to calculate  c G ˆ (computation error). 
  The variance of the estimator due to the idiosyncratic error shrinks proportionally with 
the population in each geographic area.  Thus, smaller populations within each geographic area 
are associated with larger idiosyncratic errors, introducing a limit to the extent of disaggregation 
that may be achieved.  The variance of the estimator due to the model error can be calculated 
using the delta method: 
Ñ Ñ = ) ˆ (x V V
T
Model  
where  [ ] x ¶ ¶ = Ñ /
E G ,  ( ) x V is the variance-covariance matrix of the first stage estimators, and 
x ˆis a consistent estimator of x , also obtained from the first stage.  This component of the 
predicted errors is determined by the properties of the first-stage estimators and therefore doesn’t 
systematically change with the population in each geographic area; its magnitude depends only 
on the precision of the first-stage estimates.  The variance of the estimator due to computational 
error  depends  on  the  computational  methodology  used.    Since  Monte  Carlo  simulations  are 
employed  here,  it  is  possible  to  reduce  this  error  component  by  increasing  the  number  of 
simulations;  we use  250  simulations  to  minimize  the  error  component  to the  greatest  extent 
possible. 
  The expected value of the poverty indicator coefficient is thus conditional on the first 
stage regression, the variance due to the idiosyncratic component of income per capita of the 
households, and the gradient vector.  The Monte Carlo simulation generates 250 vectors of error 
terms from the distribution estimated in the first stage. With each set of vectors, the poverty 
indicator  is  calculated.    Then,  the  expected  value  simulated  for  the  poverty  indicator  is  the 
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Finally, it is important to underscore the crucial assumption that the models estimated 
using survey data are applicable to the observations of the census.  This assumption is reasonable 
enough if the year of the census and the survey coincide or are close. In the case of this particular 
study, the 2002 census is matched with the 2003 CASEN survey, making the assumption implicit 
in the methodology reasonable.   26 
Appendix 2 
  This Appendix describes the adjustments to the CASEN undertaken by ECLAC. See also 
ECLAC,  IPEA,  and  UNDP  (2002).    Although  any  of  these  adjustments  may  theoretically 
introduce bias, Contreras and Larrañaga (1999) present evidence to the contrary.    
The first type of  adjustment  made by ECLAC is related to non-response and invalid 
answers.    In  particular,  ECLAC  makes  adjustments  in  three  cases:  people  who  declare 
themselves as employed but who do not report income from their main occupation; people who 
declared themselves to be retired or living on a pension but who do not report the amount of the 
pension; and households living in owner-occupied housing but who do not report a rental value.  
In the first and second case, ECLAC imputes the value of the mean income for each person 
based  on  family  relationship,  gender,  educational  attainment,  occupation,  type  of  economic 
activity, and region of residence.  In the third case, ECLAC imputes an implicit rental value 
using the “hot deck” technique, wherein the data set is ordered geographically and households 
are  selected  based  on  the  housing  tenancy,  the  type  of  housing,  and  other  household 
characteristics.  By contrast, when households report a positive value for imputed rent despite not 
being owners, the value reported is subtracted from the household income.  
ECLAC also adjusts for under- and over-reporting of some types of income.  The procedure 
basically consists in adjusting income from specific sources to match corresponding values in the 
National Accounts System of the Central Bank of Chile’s Households and Expenditures Account.  
To  do  this,  the  data  from  National  Accounts  is  converted  to  match  the  income  categories 
included in the CASEN.  Then, the total values for each specific income category are compared 
to  those  in  the  CASEN.    Finally,  the  proportional  differences  for  each  income  category  are 
imputed uniformly to each individual receiving income in the CASEN. There are two exceptions   27 
to this last step: adjustments to capital income are made only to the top quintile of households, 
and income from transfers and gifts are not adjusted at all.     28 
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Figure 3. Pre-Transfer (Left) vs. Post-Transfer HCR (Right), Regions I, II, III, IV 
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Figure 4. Pre-Transfer (Left) vs. Post-Transfer HCR (Right), Regions V, XIII 
   
 
Figure 5. Pre-Transfer (Left) vs. Post-Transfer HCR (Right), Regions VI, VII, VIII, IX 
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Figure 6. Pre-Transfer (Left) vs. Post-Transfer HCR (Right), Regions X, XI, XII 
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Table 1. Poverty-Reduction Transfers by Region 
 
  Family Subsidy
A  Unemployment




‡  Amount*  Average**  Recipients
†  Share
‡  Amount*  Average**  Recipients
†  Share
‡  Amount*  Average** 
I  19,122  4.50%  $ 76,603  $ 4,006  135  0.03%  $ 1,524  $ 11,291  6,249  1.47%  $ 282,220  $ 45,163 
II  15,454  3.21%  $ 61,169  $ 3,958  47  0.01%  $ 540  $ 11,498  5,862  1.22%  $ 263,641  $ 44,975 
III  18,328  7.24%  $ 74,011  $ 4,038  70  0.03%  $ 797  $ 11,388  5,980  2.36%  $ 270,571  $ 45,246 
IV  50,402  8.36%  $ 200,837  $ 3,985  149  0.02%  $ 1,716  $ 11,514  20,273  3.36%  $ 920,557  $ 45,408 
V  81,648  5.33%  $ 326,416  $ 3,998  519  0.03%  $ 6,053  $ 11,663  32,502  2.12%  $ 1,461,835  $ 44,977 
VI  52,494  6.77%  $ 208,443  $ 3,971  114  0.01%  $ 1,297  $ 11,374  23,730  3.06%  $ 1,065,764  $ 44,912 
VII  100,010  11.05%  $ 396,176  $ 3,961  144  0.02%  $ 1,651  $ 11,468  30,825  3.40%  $ 1,388,065  $ 45,030 
VIII  180,915  9.73%  $ 717,320  $ 3,965  544  0.03%  $ 6,266  $ 11,517  77,195  4.15%  $ 3,450,309  $ 44,696 
IX  109,755  12.65%  $ 447,964  $ 4,081  190  0.02%  $ 2,270  $ 11,949  54,944  6.33%  $ 2,490,582  $ 45,329 
X  117,391  11.01%  $ 471,432  $ 4,016  203  0.02%  $ 2,358  $ 11,617  56,699  5.32%  $ 2,570,569  $ 45,337 
XI  8,732  9.70%  $ 35,546  $ 4,071  9  0.01%  $ 109  $ 12,056  4,144  4.61%  $ 187,565  $ 45,262 
XII  3,296  2.23%  $ 13,059  $ 3,962  29  0.02%  $ 342  $ 11,776  2,107  1.43%  $ 96,191  $ 45,653 
XIII  196,350  3.25%  $ 799,425  $ 4,071  1,475  0.02%  $ 16,768  $ 11,368  103,829  1.72%  $ 4,672,439  $ 45,001 
Total  953,897  6.34%  $ 3,828,403  $ 4,013  3,628  0.02%  $ 41,691  $ 11,491  424,339  2.82%  $ 19,120,309  $ 45,059 
                         
  Solidarity Subsidy
B  Water Subsidy
B     
Region  Recipients
†  Share
‡  Amount*  Average**  Recipients
†  Share
‡  Amount*  Average**  Expected Value of Subsidy   
I  1,690  1.51%  $ 16,739  $ 9,905  32,595  29.14%  $ 181,758  $ 5,576       $ 1,317   
II  910  0.73%  $ 8,749  $ 9,615  37,787  30.45%  $ 276,450  $ 7,316       $ 1,267   
III  1,683  2.45%  $ 16,425  $ 9,760  25,355  36.91%  $ 87,661  $ 3,457       $ 1,775   
IV  1,809  1.08%  $ 17,837  $ 9,860  43,160  25.86%  $ 169,403  $ 3,925       $ 2,173   
V  4,559  1.03%  $ 45,113  $ 9,895  81,311  18.45%  $ 315,421  $ 3,879       $ 1,408   
VI  2,562  1.20%  $ 24,642  $ 9,618  33,872  15.81%  $ 90,136  $ 2,661       $ 1,792   
VII  4,900  1.94%  $ 47,824  $ 9,760  63,292  25.10%  $ 133,662  $ 2,112       $ 2,173   
VIII  6,612  1.31%  $ 65,342  $ 9,882  103,670  20.61%  $ 368,358  $ 3,553       $ 2,478   
IX  3,815  1.60%  $ 38,189  $ 10,010  52,692  22.11%  $ 139,084  $ 2,640       $ 3,595   
X  4,881  1.65%  $ 48,541  $ 9,945  50,919  17.21%  $ 194,525  $ 3,820       $ 3,083   
XI  371  1.44%  $ 3,710  $ 10,000  9,253  36.01%  $ 47,448  $ 5,128       $ 3,049   
XII  528  1.22%  $ 5,134  $ 9,723  8,612  19.93%  $ 28,475  $ 3,307       $ 971   
XIII  9,898  0.60%  $ 96,938  $ 9,794  109,236  6.59%  $ 251,741  $ 2,305       $ 966   
Total  44,218  1.07%  $ 435,184  $ 9,842  651,752  15.74%  $ 2,284,122  $ 3,505       $ 1,708   
A Source: Superintendent of Social Security. The Family Subsidy, Unemployment, and Assistance Pensions are given to individuals. 
B Source: Executive Committee, Chile Solidario, Ministry of Planning. The Solidarity Subsidy and Water Subsidy are given to households.  
† Represents the average number of beneficiaries each month.  
‡ Indicates the percentage of individuals or households in the region that receive the subsidy. 
* Represents the total monthly value of the transfer, by region, in thousands of Chilean Pesos. 
** Indicates the average monthly value of the transfer for all recipients in the region.   34 





























Number of Counties  10  9  9  15  38  33  30  52  31  42  10  11  52 
Pre-Transfer Headcount Ratios                       
  Maximum  45.5%  27.2%  37.2%  43.7%  36.1%  31.9%  45.5%  54.3%  53.3%  42.4%  36.0%  25.9%  37.6% 
  Minimum  22.9%  12.9%  23.7%  26.0%  21.1%  21.6%  30.8%  26.6%  31.3%  27.8%  20.2%  3.2%  1.6% 
  Median  35.1%  19.0%  33.1%  37.0%  28.3%  27.6%  34.8%  45.8%  46.1%  35.4%  25.1%  5.0%  25.5% 
Change in Estimated Headcount Ratio                       
  Median  -19.7%  -6.6%  -11.9%  -16.9%  -9.3%  -13.3%  -17.7%  -16.0%  -18.2%  -22.3%  -28.3%  -28.7%  -7.5% 
  Std. Dev.  7.4%  13.0%  10.8%  7.2%  2.3%  4.2%  4.1%  4.2%  3.2%  6.6%  22.0%  14.1%  2.5% 
   35 
Table 3. Correlates of Poverty Reduction at the County Level 
 
Variable  Unit  (1)  (2) 
Population  log  0.00153***  (0.00012)  0.00136***  (0.00014) 
Urban Share  %  -0.06323***  (0.00348)  -0.05350***  (0.00483) 
Mountains  1/0  0.00101***  (0.00017)  0.00872***  (0.00152) 
Central Valley  1/0  -0.00426***  (0.00023)  -0.00411***  (0.00034) 
Extreme Rainfall  1/0  -0.01210***  (0.00114)  -0.01221***  (0.00133) 
Region I x Urban Share  interaction  -0.05207***  (0.00443)  -0.06436***  (0.00708) 
Region II x Urban Share  interaction  -0.15193***  (0.03024)  -0.15476***  (0.04872) 
Region III x Urban Share  interaction  -0.14827***  (0.00952)  -0.15598***  (0.00838) 
Region IV x Urban Share  interaction  -0.10081***  (0.00329)  -0.11126***  (0.00457) 
Region V x Urban Share  interaction  -0.04027***  (0.00303)  -0.05401***  (0.00426) 
Region VI x Urban Share  interaction  -0.06344***  (0.00316)  -0.07478***  (0.00439) 
Region VII x Urban Share  interaction  -0.06358***  (0.00319)  -0.07447***  (0.00457) 
Region VIII x Urban Share  interaction  -0.05667***  (0.00304)  -0.06484***  (0.00435) 
Region IX x Urban Share  interaction  -0.05021***  (0.00322)  -0.05951***  (0.00429) 
Region X x Urban Share  interaction  -0.10270***  (0.00305)  -0.11134***  (0.00408) 
Region XI x Urban Share  interaction  -0.20490***  (0.00509)  -0.21506***  (0.00649) 
Region XII x Urban Share  interaction  -0.12343***  (0.00702)  -0.13258***  (0.01384) 
Region I x Mountains  interaction        -0.02358***  (0.00410) 
Region II x Mountains  interaction        0.00120  (0.00596) 
Region III x Mountains  interaction        -0.00344  (0.00370) 
Region IV x Mountains  interaction        -0.00998***  (0.00174) 
Region V x Mountains  interaction        -0.01198***  (0.00147) 
Region VI x Mountains  interaction        -0.01138***  (0.00148) 
Region VII x Mountains  interaction        -0.01656***  (0.00154) 
Region VIII x Mountains  interaction        -0.00479***  (0.00148) 
Region IX x Mountains  interaction        -0.00724***  (0.00154) 
Region X x Mountains  interaction        -0.00572***  (0.00139) 
Region XI x Mountains  interaction        0.01507***  (0.00441) 
Constant     0.11746***  (0.00249)  0.10921***  (0.00407) 
Region dummies    yes    yes   
Observations      341 341 
R-squared    0.96    0.96   
      No county in Region XII is situated above 1,500 meters 
      Robust bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
      * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 